Abstract. We develop an e cient identity based signature scheme based on pairings whose security relies on the hardness of the Di e-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. We describe how this scheme is obtained as a special version of a more general generic scheme which yields further new provably secure identity based signature schemes if pairings are used. The generic scheme also includes traditional public key signature schemes. We further discuss issues of key escrow and the distribution of keys to multiple trust authorities. The appendix contains a brief description of the relevant properties of supersingular elliptic curves and the Weil and Tate pairings.
Introduction
Digital signatures are one of the most important security services o ered by cryptography. In traditional public key signature algorithms the public key of the signer is essentially a random bit string picked from a given set. This leads to a problem of how the public key is associated with the physical entity which is meant to be performing the signing. In these traditional systems the binding between the public key and the identity of the signer is obtained via a digital certi cate. As noticed by Shamir 18] it would be more e cient if there was no need for such a binding, in that the users identity would be their public key, more accurately, given the users identity the public key could be easily derived using some public deterministic algorithm.
An identity based signature scheme based on the di culty of factoring integers is given in 18], and it remained an open problem to develop an identity based encryption scheme. In 2001 two such schemes were given, the rst by Cocks 7] was based on the quadratic residuosity problem, whilst the second given by Boneh and Franklin 3] was based on the bilinear Di e-Hellman problem with respect to a pairing, e.g. the Weil pairing.
Originally the existence of the Weil pairing was thought to be a bad thing in cryptography. For example in 10] it was shown that the discrete logarithm problem in supersingular elliptic curves was reducible to that in a nite eld using the Weil pairing. This led supersingular elliptic curves to be dropped from cryptographic use. The situation changed with the work of Joux 9] , who gave a simple tripartite Di e-Hellman protocol based on the Weil pairing on supersingular curves. Since Joux's paper a number of other applications have arisen, including an identity based encryption scheme 3] and a general signature algorithm 4]. The extension to higher genus curves and abelian varieties has also recently been fully explored in 8, 16] . This new work has resulted in a rekindling of cryptographic interest in supersingular elliptic curves.
In 17] an identity based public key signature algorithm is given which uses the Weil pairing and other identity based signature schemes 5, 14] have recently been proposed.
In this paper we present an identity based signature scheme whose security is based on the Di e-Hellman problem in the domain of the pairing. Furthermore, we describe a generic scheme in a more general underlying situation and relate its security to a computational problem. Instantiations of this scheme using pairings then yield further new identity based signature schemes with security again based on the above Di e-Hellman problem. These schemes are di erent from 5, 14, 17] and we argue that they can o er advantages over those schemes. Furthermore it appears possible that there are other instantiations of the general scheme, using for example RSA one way functions instead of pairings similar to Shamir's scheme 18]. Finally we address issues regarding key escrow and the distribution of keys to multiple trust authorities and discuss in the appendix how our schemes can be realized using elliptic curves and the Weil or Tate pairings.
2 An Identity Based Signature Scheme Let (G; +) and (V; ) denote cyclic groups of prime order l, P 2 G a generator of G and let e : G G ! V be a pairing which satis es the following conditions. 1. Bilinear: e(x 1 + x 2 ; y) = e(x 1 ; y)e(x 2 ; y) and e(x; y 1 + y 2 ) = e(x; y 1 )e(x; y 2 ).
2. Non-degenerate: There exists x 2 G and y 2 G such that e(x; y) 6 = 1.
We also assume that e(x; y) can be easily computed while, for any given random b 2 G and c 2 V , it should be infeasible to compute x 2 G such that e(x; b) = c. We remark that the pairing e is not required to be symmetric or antisymmetric. Furthermore we de ne the hash functions h : f0; 1g V ! (Z=lZ) ; H : f0; 1g ! G where G := Gnf0g. We also abbreviate V := V nf1g.
The identity based signature scheme consists of four algorithms, Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify. There are three parties in the system, the trust authority (or TA), the signer and the veri er. Scheme 1. Setup : The TA picks a random integer t 2 (Z=lZ) , computes Q TA = tP and publishes Q TA while t is kept secret.
Extract : This algorithm is performed by the TA when a signer requests the secret key corresponding to their identity. Suppose the signer's identity is given by the string ID. The secret key of the identity is then given by S ID = tH(ID), which is computed by the TA and given to the signer.
The extraction step is typically done once for every identity and uses the same setup data for many di erent identities.
Sign : To sign a message m the signer chooses an arbitrary P 1 2 G , picks a random integer k 2 (Z=lZ) and computes:
1. r = e(P 1 ; P) k . 2. v = h(m; r). 3 . u = vS ID + kP 1 .
The signature is then the pair (u; v) 2 (G; (Z=lZ) ). Verify : On receiving a message m and signature (u; v) the veri er computes:
1. r = e(u; P) e(H(ID); ?Q TA ) v .
Accept the signature if and only if v = h(m; r).
It is straightforward to check that the veri cation equation holds for a valid signature.
We discuss some general performance enhancements for Scheme 1. The signing operation can be further optimized by the signer precomputing e(P 1 ; P) for a P 1 of his choice, for example P 1 = S ID , and storing this value with the signing key. For P 1 = S ID this means that the signing operation involves one exponentiation in the group V , one hash function evaluation and one multiplication involving an element in the group G. The veri cation operation requires one exponentiation in V , one hash function evaluation and two evaluations of the pairing. One of the pairing evaluations can be eliminated, if a large number of veri cations are to be performed for the same identity, by precomputing e(H(ID); ?Q TA ).
For the security of Scheme 1 we have the following theorem. The attack model is explained in section 5. Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, suppose that an adaptive adversary A exists which makes at most n 1 1 queries of an identity hash and extraction oracle, at most n 2 1 queries of a message hash and signature oracle and which succeeds within time T A of making an existential forgery with probability " A a n 1 n 
The pairing computation is the operation which by far takes the most running time. The verifying step in Scheme 1 and the scheme of 14] can be optimized to 1E + 1P and 2E + 1P respectively if the same identities occur frequently, thus roughly taking half the runtime of 5]. The scheme in 17] requires 3P (2P in the optimized version) and is hence the slowest. In terms of communication requirements Scheme 1 is at least as e cient as the other two since an element in G requires at least as much memory as an element in (Z=lZ) (remember #G = l). Often one would actually need to apply special compression techniques in G.
In terms of provable security Scheme 1 and the scheme of 5] rely on the hardness of the Di e-Hellman problem in G. There is no formal reduction to an underlying hard problem in 14, 17] .
We conclude that Scheme 1 can o er advantages in runtime, communication requirements and provable security over the schemes 5, 14, 17].
Key Escrow
In this section we pause to discuss the issue of key escrow. The generalization of Scheme 1 will then be given in the next section.
One criticism against identity based signature schemes, as opposed to identity based encryption schemes, is that the trust authority has access to the signer's private key and hence can sign messages as if they came from the signer. This escrow facility is deemed a great draw back for signature schemes, whereas one could debate that such an escrow facility for encryption may be desirable.
All previous identity based signature schemes have this built in escrow property. By using multiple trust authorities however the threat from escrowing the private key can be reduced. For Shamir's original scheme 18] one would for example need to produce an RSA modulus N and a public exponent e such that no individual trust authority knows the factors of N and each trust authority has a share d i of the private exponent d. Protocols exist for this problem, see for example 1], 2] and 6]. In order to distribute shares of the private key, a secret sharing scheme has also been applied in 3] in the identity based encryption setting. In general such a strategy would require a third party which computes the shares of the private key and distributes them to the trust authorities, together with some other data (e.g. appropriate Lagrange coe cients) allowing a signer to reconstruct his private key given the private partial information he obtains from su ciently many trust authorities. In the case of an (n; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme the third party can however be dropped resulting in a similar, more e cient technique as follows.
Suppose we have the trust authorities TA i for 1 i n. We can trivially \distribute" the master secret t among the n trusted authorities in the following way. Each TA i generates their own private key t i independently of each other and publishes Q TAi = t i P: The master private key is de ned to be t = P n i=1 t i ; a quantity completely unknown to any of the participants in the scheme. The master public key is Q TA = P n i=1 Q TA i : A signer obtains a share of its private key from each TA i via S (i) ID = t i Q ID : The signer's secret key is then computed by the signer via S ID = P n i=1 S (i) ID : For the trust authorities to determine the signer's private key they would all need to collude, providing the (n; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
There is the possibility of one or several trust authorities cheating and not responding with the correct value of S ID , using a binary search method. This is a technique which will require O(log n) signing operations to determine an i with an incorrect value of S (i) ID .
A Generic Signature Scheme
In this section we explain the general principle behind Scheme 1 thereby obtaining the generic scheme and further identity based signature schemes. We relate the security of these schemes to a computational problem which specializes to the Di e-Hellman problem in G if pairings are used. Finally the key escrow problem is discussed brie y and some examples are given.
Let (G; +), (G 1 ; +) and (V; ) denote cyclic groups of prime order l and p : G ! V an e ciently computable monomorphism. We de ne a hash function h : f0; 1g V ! (Z=lZ) (Z=lZ) with image size greater than or equal to l. There will be various choices for h as described later. We further de ne a full hash function H : f0; 1g ! G 1 where G 1 := G 1 nf0g. We also abbreviate again G := Gnf0g and V := V nf1g.
The general signature scheme consists of four algorithms, Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify. There are three parties in such a system, the trust authority (or TA), the signer and the veri er. Scheme 2. Setup : The TA chooses e ciently computable monomorphisms s : G 1 ! G and q : G 1 ! V with p(s(x)) = q(x) for all x 2 G 1 and publishes q, while s is kept secret.
Extract : This algorithm is performed by the TA when a signer requests the secret key corresponding to their identity. Suppose the signer's identity is given by the string ID. The secret key of the identity is then given by a = s(H(ID)), which is computed by the TA and given to the signer. The extraction step is typically done once for every identity and uses the same setup data for many di erent identities. The public key of the signer is y = q(H(ID)) which can be computed by the veri er using the identity of the signer.
Sign : To sign a message m the signer picks a random k 2 G and then computes: 
Security
We proceed with the security discussion. We consider an adversary A which is assumed to be a (polynomial time) probabilistic Turing machine which besides the global scheme parameters takes as input q and a random tape. The adversary's goal is to produce an existential forgery of a signature by a signer ID of its choice. To aid the adversary we allow it to query four oracles:
Identity Hash Oracle : For any given identity ID this oracle will produce the corresponding hash value H(ID).
Extraction Oracle : For any given identity ID this oracle will produce the corresponding secret key s(H(ID)).
Message Hash Oracle : For any given message m and r 2 V this oracle will produce the corresponding hash value h(m; r).
Signature Oracle : For any given message m and identity ID this oracle will produce a signature from the user with identity ID on the message m.
Of course the output of the adversary A should not be a signature such that the secret key of the corresponding identity or the signature itself have been asked of the oracles.
Theorem 2. In the random oracle model, suppose that an adaptive adversary A exists which makes at most n 1 1 queries of the identity hash and extraction oracle, at most n 2 1 queries of the message hash and signature oracle and which succeeds within time T A of making an existential forgery with probability " A a n 1 n on input of any given P; R 2 G 1 and Q 2 G with Q = s(P), in expected time T C c n 1 n 2 T A " A :
Proof. We assume familiarity with 15] and their proof technique. Let P; R 2 G 1 and Q 2 G be generators such that Q = s(P) and hence p(Q) = q(P). We rst explain how the oracle queries of A are simulated. For the i-th identity hash or extraction query for ID i we return H(ID i ) := i P and, if requested, s(H(ID i )) = i Q where i 2 (Z=lZ) and = ( i ) i=1;2;::: constitutes a random tape. A query for the hash value h(m; r), if not yet de ned, is answered by a random (v; w) = i 2 (Z=lZ) (Z=lZ) which is successively taken from a random tape = ( i ) i=1;2;::: . To sign a message m for ID we issue the hash query H(ID) ourselves and generate a random u 2 G and a random vector (v; w) 2 (Z=lZ) (Z=lZ) where u = and (v; w) = j are successively taken from the random tapes = ( ) and = ( j ) respectively. Let y := q(H(ID)). We then compute r := (p(u)=y v ) 1=w . We remark that r is a random element in V since and are random and independent. We de ne the hash value h(m; r) := (v; w) and return the signature (u; r). This procedure fails if r = 1 or h(m; r) is already de ned (the adversary could for example make a large number of queries h(m; r) without us computing and recording the associated signatures). Since r is random the probability for a simulation failure during the n 2 message hash and signing queries is less than 2n 2 2 =l. The simulation is indistinguishable since (u; r) is random.
Running A and answering its oracle queries in the described way depends deterministically on , , and the random tape ! the adversary A is provided with. Because of the assumption on A, the indistinguishability and the low failure probability of the simulation, providing random values and running A results in a signature in time T A with probability at least " A ? 2n 2 2 =l " A =2 (true for a = 14) , using at most n 1 identity and extraction queries, n 2 message hash and signature queries. This reduces the discussion to the case of a \passive" adversary, depending deterministically on , , and !.
We now want to apply the forking lemma technique of 15] to control the identity hash and message hash values for which the adversary computes forged signatures.
We can proceed almost verbatim as in 15, Lemma 8] and its proof: Since the probability of guessing the hash value of an identity is 1=l and " A =2 7n 1 =l (true for a = 14) , running A repeatedly with random input yields a signature for the hash value H(ID ) = P and ( nite) index after (expected) 4=" A executions with probability at least 4=5. Next, with probability 1=4 we have that a replay of A with the same , , !, and = ( i ) unchanged for i < and randomly chosen for i , yields a signature with probability at least (" A =2)=(14n 1 ), for the now di erent H(ID ) = P but same . The point is that we may as well answer the -th identity hash query of A by values R for random 2 (Z=lZ) since this is as random as H(ID ) and A does not issue an extraction query for this identity, which we could not answer. As an aside, note that if we have an identity hash collision H(ID 0 ) = H(ID ) = R we have solved the discrete logarithm problem R = P, namely = 0 = . We combine these steps similar to 15, Lemma 8] . Replaying A an at most (14n 1 )=(" A =2) (expected) times and answering the -th identity hash query with random values R results in a signature for some R with probability at least 3=5. We thus obtain a machine B which on input of , and the random tape ! 0 returns a signature for an identity hash R in time T B (4=" A + (14n 1 )=(" A =2))T A 32n 1 T A =" A with probability " B 1=9, where depends on , , ! 0 and is drawn from a set of (14n 1 )=(" A =2) candidates which depends only on ! 0 . Furthermore at most 32n 1 n 2 =" A values are taken from and the message hash h(m; r) of the signature equals one of the last n 2 queried values of .
We apply the forking lemma a second time, now to B and with respect to (and regarding , ! 0 as one random tape). The conditions of 15, Lemma 8] are satis ed because we may assume that " B 1=9 7n 2 =l (this is true for a = 63). Feeding , , ! 0 , the input to B, from a random tape ! 00 we obtain a machine C which on input of ! 00 replays B at most 2=" B + 14n 2 =" B times and returns two signatures (u 1 ; r) and (u 2 ; r) with message hash values h 1 (m; r) and h 2 (m; r) for the same m; r and identity hash values 1 R and 2 R, in time T C 16n 2 T B =" B and with probability " C 1=9. The value of m; r is the same since up to the query of h 1 (m; r) and h 2 (m; r) identical operations are carried out by the replays of B, as = ( j ) for j < for some xed index and ; ! 0 remain unchanged. Furthermore, the h i (m; r) are randomly chosen from the set of successful hash values for the given xed ; ! 0 which has cardinality " B =(14n 2 )(l ? 1) Finally, we observe that the expected number of replays of A and B might not be explicitly known so that B and C cannot be given in the form above. In this case we can apply the same technique as in 15 The constants in the proof can be optimized when l is chosen large with respect to n 1 and n 2 . Also, the assumption " A a n 1 n 2 2 =l of the theorem can be replaced by weaker assumptions as used in the proof. Theorem 2 says in other words that, given p; q and one or several equations Q = s(P), for the signature scheme to be secure it should be infeasible to compute other values s(R). If this is the case then the TA's secret knowledge of s thus provides a generalized trap door with respect to p and q.
Multiple Trust Authorities
The general signature scheme can be extended to multiple trust authorities TA i in the following way. Suppose s i : G 1 ! G and q i : G 1 ! V are the secret and public monomorphisms of TA i for 1 i n. We can then form a virtual trust authority TA de ned by the monomorphisms s(x) := P n i=1 s i (x) and q(x) := Q n i=1 q i (x) such that p(s(x)) = q(x) for all x 2 G 1 . Note that since the s i are random and independent, the probability of s and q not to be injective is 1=l. The signer computes his private key via s(H(ID)) = P i s i (H(ID)) where he obtains the s i (H(ID)) from each TA i in turn. The veri er determines the signer's public key via q(H(ID)) = Q i q i (H(ID)) where he computes the q i (H(ID)) using the public monomorphisms q i of each TA i .
Let I J = f1; : : : ; ng and I \ J = fg. An existential forgery with respect to the virtual trust authority TA under collusion of the TA i for i 2 I is equivalent to an existential forgery with respect to the virtual trust authority obtained by combining the TA i for i 2 J, for which we can apply Theorem 2.
Examples Example 1. The pairing based signature scheme Scheme 1 is obtained from the general Scheme 2 in the following way. We let (G 1 ; +) = (G; +) and de ne p(x) := e(x; P), q(x) := e(x; Q TA ) and s(x) := tx. Since P and Q TA are public, p(x) and q(x) can be computed by all parties. As t is known to the TA it can compute s(x). The steps of Scheme 1 are obtained from the steps of Scheme 2 together with the slight modi cation outlined in the remarks about Schnorr signatures. Other schemes can be obtained from the variations of hash functions and the parameter order as described above. With respect to the security we have p(Q TA ) = q(P) which we need for the assumptions of Theorem 2. It follows that if there is an adversary, we can compute s(x) without knowing t. Now, if we are given (P; Q TA ; R) we can thus compute s(R) = tR where Q TA = tP, thereby solving the Di e-Hellman problem in G. This proves Theorem 1.
Example 2. The usual public key signature schemes are obtained as follows.
Let (G 1 ; +) = (V; ) and q be the identity. The trust authority is now identical to the signer and there are no other signers associated. The signer chooses a 2 G at random and computes y = p(a). The monomorphism s is the inverse of p. A typical example would be p(x) = g x such that s is the discrete logarithm map with respect to the element g. In the attack model we would arti cially require q(H(ID)) = H(ID) = y and that precisely one H-query is made. As a consequence, n 1 = 1 and Theorem 2 implies the standard security of the schemes in the single user setting, relating it to the inversion of p.
Example 3. If we take (G; +) = (G 1 ; +) = (V; ) = (Z=nZ) for n an RSAmodulus we essentially recover versions of the identity based signature scheme in 18]. Note that we have de ned our general scheme only for cyclic groups of prime order whereas (Z=nZ) is in general not cyclic of prime order. Thus Theorem 2 cannot readily be applied. Since (Z=nZ) is not too far from being cyclic it might be possible to adapt Scheme 2 and Theorem 2 towards this case.
Conclusion
We have described a generic signature scheme which gives rise to e cient identity based signature schemes if pairings are used. The security of these schemes follows from the security of the generic scheme in the random oracle model and is based on the Di e-Hellman problem in the domain of the used pairing. Other instantiations of the generic scheme include traditional public key signature schemes in cyclic groups. In addition we have discussed key escrow and the distribution of keys to multiple trust authorities.
More precisely G will be a point subgroup on an elliptic curve over a nite eld and V a subgroup of the cyclic group of a larger nite eld. We remark that elements in G can be represented in compressed form. Also, in Scheme 1 the signature consists of v 2 (Z=lZ) instead of r 2 V , resulting in a more bandwidth e cient scheme.
The Weil and Tate Pairings on Elliptic Curves
We shall summarize the properties we require of the Weil pairing, much of the details can be found in 3], 10] and 19]. We also present the Tate pairing since it is more e cient to compute than the Weil pairing.
Let E be an elliptic curve de ned over F q and let G be a subgroup of E(F q ) of prime order l. For simplicity we will assume that l 2 -#E(F q ) so G = E(F q ) l].
We de ne to be the smallest integer such that l j (q ? 1):
The full l-torsion group E l] is de ned over a unique minimal extension eld F q k , E l] E(F q k ):
In practical implementations we will require k and to be small. Let G 0 be a subgroup of E l] such that E l] = G G 0 .
The Weil pairing is a non-degenerate, bilinear and antisymmetric pairing e l : E l] E l] ! F q k : We cannot use it immediately for our purpose since e l (P; Q) = 1 for any P; Q 2 G. To overcome this problem one possibility is to consider an (injective) non F q -rational endomorphism : G ! G 0 . We de ne e : G G ! F q k ; e(P; Q) := e l (P; (Q)):
This yields a pairing of the required properties since P and (Q) are linearly independent. Such non rational endomorphisms are known to exist for supersingular elliptic curves. They do not exist for ordinary elliptic curves since the Frobenius acts trivially on G. Both cases yield pairings with the required properties.
If there are no non rational endomorphisms we could use any group homomorphism : G ! G 0 de ned by P 7 ! P 0 for an arbitrary P 0 2 G 0 nf0g. The computation of the pairing in the signature schemes only requires the evaluation of at P and Q TA which means that the two additional points P 0 = (P ) and Q 0 TA = (Q TA ), to be computed by the trust authority, have to be publicly known. The Weil and Tate pairings are e ciently computable by an unpublished, but much referenced, algorithm of Miller 12] . Suppose given P; Q 2 G we wish to compute e l (P; (Q)) or t l (P; (Q)). We rst compute, via Miller's algorithm, the functions f P and f (Q) whose divisors are given by (f P ) = l(P + X) ? l(X) and (f (Q) ) = l( (Q)) ? l(O); where X 2 G is randomly chosen such that #f O; (Q); X; P + X g = 4. Note, that since P 2 G E(F q ) we have f P 2 F q (x; y) whilst since (Q) 2 G 0 we have f (Q) 2 F q r (x; y) where r = k or r = respectively. This means that computing f P is easier than computing f (Q) . The Weil pairing is then given by e l (P; (Q)) = f P (( (Q)) ? (O)) f (Q) ((P + X) ? (X)) and the Tate pairing is computed via t l (P; (Q)) = f P (( (Q)) ? (O)):
We see that not only is the Tate pairing easier to compute, since we do not need to compute f (Q) , but the single function we need to compute, namely f P , is easier to compute than f (Q) since one can work over F q instead of F q k .
These facts together make computing the Tate pairing around fty percent more e cient than the Weil pairing. On the other hand the value of the Tate pairing has to be raised to the power of (q ? 1) =l to obtain the nal result, and f (Q) can be computed as (f Q ) using much more operations over F q than over F q k .
Supersingular Elliptic Curves
Only supersingular elliptic curves provide non F q -rational endomorphisms. 
